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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a Special Verdict rendered by 
a civil jury on the 10th day of April, 1987, and a judgment 
entered therein on the 7th day of May, 1987. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent asks that the judgment of the District 
Court be affirmed. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Following the entry of judgment, the appellant filed 
a Notice of Appeal on June 2, 1987 (Record, Vol. 6, pp. 
269-270). On May 4, 1987, appellant filed a Motion for a New 
Trial (Record, Vol. 6, pp. 144-145). On May 19, 1987, the 
Court denied plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial (Record, Vol. 
6, page 225). On June 2. 1987, appellant filed a Motion to 
Amend Judgment (Record, Vol. 6, page 249). On August 4, 1987, 
the trial court denied the Motion to Amend (Record, Vol. 6, 
page 278). On August 24, 1987, appellant filed a second Not-
ice of Appeal (Record, Vol. 6, page 281). 
Appellant has filed a Motion to Consolidate the two 
appeals for purposes of briefing. Pursuant to the provisions 
of Rule 4(b), Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, the Notice 
of Appeal filed prior to the disposition of the Motion for a 
New Trial and the Motion to Amend the Judgment has no effect. 
and the new Notice of Appeal is the only one that presently 
confers jurisdiction upon this Court, and is the only one to 
be considered in this appeal. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL 
Respondent does not elect to restate the issues, 
since appellant is bound by its own statement of issues. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
"Jane Doe" was a passenger on a motorcycle drive 
her husband. The motorcycle was involved in an accident 
an automobile driven by Melvin Reeves. Melvin Reeves subse-
quently died for reasons unrelated to this case, and the de-
fendant herein, Shirlene Hafen, was substituted as personal 
representative ad litem for the Estate of Melvin Reeves. 
The case was tried to a jury in the Fifth Judicial 
District Court, in Washington County, at St. George, on April 
8, 9, and 10, 1987. The jury returned a verdict in favor of 
"Jane Doe", and assessed damages in the amount of $10,000 
special damages and $20,000 general damages. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Respondent accepts the Statement of Facts of the 
appellant. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I 
Prior to voir dire examination of prospective jurors, 
plaintiff submitted a series of requested voir dire ques-
tions^ The Court examined each of those and discussed them 
with counsel, and declined to ask questions pertaining to 
matters of privacy of the jury, or questions that would not 
shed light on the bias, prejudice or impartiality of the jur-
ors, but which were covered substantially in the interroga-
tion of the jurors conducted by the trial judge. 
The Court refused to ask improper questions pertain-
ing to insurance matters as being inviolation of Rule 411 of 
the Rules of Evidence and the prior decisions of the Utah 
Supreme Court. The Court further refused to ask questions 
pertaining to an alleged "insurance crisis" or "liability 
crisis." 
The questions declined by the Court were in conform-
ity with prior case law. Rule 411 of the Rules of Evidence, 
and the responsibility of the Court to avoid the injection of 
prejudicial questioning or statements being given to the jury. 
Point II 
The refusal of the Court to ask prospective jurors 
questions concerning alleged "tort reform propaganda" and the 
"insurance crisis" were in conformity to the case law of the 
State of Utah, and in accordance with the broad discretion of 
the trial court in the conduct of voir dire requests. Such 
requests were unsupported by any case or statutory authority 
applicable to this trial court, nor were they persuasive in 
exposing potential prejudice. 
Point III 
The claim that defendant tried to mislead the jury 
into thinking that a "sick old widow" would be responsible to 
pay the judgment is spurious and not borne out by the record. 
The record shows that the widow of Melvin Reeves was allowed 
by the trial court to sit at counsel table only during the 
voir dire examination of the prospective jurors, to assist 
counsel in selection of jury, and the jury was specifically 
informed that she was not a party to the action but was the 
widow of Melvin Reeves. 
Point IV 
The accusations of character assassination are not 
borne out by the record. The only indication of the smoking 
and alcohol drinking by the plaintiff were contained in hospi-
tal records filled out and signed by the plaintiff, and were 
not called to the attention of the jury. 
The Court declined to allow the admission of the 
evidence of possession of marijuana by the plaintiff. 
The Court specifically prohibited counsel from making 
reference to any premarital sex shown by the records and exhi-
bits admitted into evidence. 
The admission into evidence of the records showing 
that the plaintiff had had a miscarriage prior to the accident 
and a voluntary sterilization after the accident and before 
being examined by psychologists was admitted into evidence as 
being relevant and material to the claim of the plaintiff to 
neuropsychological injury, and was in no respect a character 
assassination. 
Point V 
The claim of surprise testimony is invalid, in view 
of the fact that the records submitted were the medical rec-
ords of the plaintiff herself, subpoenaed from the Dixie Medi-
cal Center one year prior to trial, and that plaintiff had 
access to those records and had failed to disclose the fact of 
the miscarriage and the voluntary sterilization to counsel and 
to her psychologists. Said records were available to plain-
tiff's counsel through normal discovery methods, and were 
available to plaintiff without the necessity of discovery 
methods. They cannot be considered as surprise testimony 
under the case law cited in the brief. 
Point VI 
The introduction of the medical records is only cor-
roborative of plaintiff's own testimony admitting, under oath, 
that prior to the accident she had had a miscarriage and that 
after the accident but before examination by the psychologist 
she had had a voluntary sterilization conducted at the Dixie 
Medical Center. The medical records corroborate that and were 
not objected to except on the basis of surprise, and with 
limited objections as to deletion of the words "alcohol" and 
"smoking" from the records. As such, the medical records are 
not prejudicial, but are factual circumstances germane to the 
defense of the claim of neuropsychological injury, and were 
properly admitted. 
Point VII 
Testimony of the lay witness Dennis Parker was con-
elusory and was without foundation. When objected to by de-
fense counsel, plaintiff's counsel failed to establish the 
foundational basis of personal observation or other basis for 
giving the conclusory remarks. Nevertheless, the evidence was 
admitted into the record, and was not an error committed by 
the trial court. 
Point VIII 
The alleged claim of exclusion of future medical 
expenses is without merit. The doctor's testimony was to the 
effect that in "the most adverse expression" of the develop-
ment of her injuries, there might need to be another opera-
tion. He could not say that there was more than a possibili-
ty. As such, the exclusions and rulings by the Court were 
appropriate. 
Point IX 
Appellant raises an objection to Instruction No. 22 
given by the Court for the first time on appeal; such objec-
tion cannot now be considered. 
Appellant further objects to Instruction No. 23, but 
the objections voiced at trial were not supported by any basis 
for the objection, and thus there was no opportunity for the 
trial Court to correct the instruction. Instruction No. 23 
was a fair statement of the law and did not effect any preju-
dice to the plaintiff's case. 
Point X 
The objection to the testimony of the treating doctor 
was due to the leading and suggestive nature of the question, 
and was sustained by the Court. Plaintiff's counsel did not 
restate the question in an acceptable manner, nor lay a foun-
dation that the doctor was qualified to testify as to the 
matters sought to be elicited from him. Thus, there was no 
error. In addition to that, the doctor was permitted to tes-
tify to the substance of the same material following the ob-
jections; thus, no error was committed and no prejudice was 
effected against the plaintiff. 
Point XI 
The verdict of the jury was fully supported by the 
evidence. The testimony of the plaintiff herself contradicted 
the testimony of the economist as to lost earnings. The tes-
timony of plaintiff's neuropsychologist refuted the same wit-
ness1 own testimony of the necessity for future medical treat-
ment. There were no prejudicial errors committed by the trial 
court. The plaintiff had a full, fair, and complete trial in 
this matter. 
Point XII 
The Court entered a valid judgment in the case, which 
provided for interest as provided by law, which would encom-
pass the award of prejudgment interest on special damages for 
past medical expenses. The Court did not err by failing to 
grant prejudgment interest. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
"JANE DOE" WAS NOT DENIED A FAIR TRIAL 
BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT REFUSED TO ASK 
SOME OF PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED QUESTIONS 
TO PROSPECTIVE JURORS. 
Prior to the commencement of the examination of the 
prospective jurors, plaintiff had submitted to the Court voir 
dire requests (Record. Vol. 5, pp. 238-243). 
In a conference in chambers prior to the commencement 
of the interrogation of jurors, the Court specifically exam-
ined and then addressed the Court's intent with regard to that 
requested voir dire examination. As part of that in chambers 
conference, the Court specifically advised plaintiff's coun-
sel: "If I don't ask the question in general or specifically 
or close enough, you can request me that I ask those ques-
tions." (April 8 Tr., 7:22-25) The Court then went through 
each of the plaintiff's requests and indicated which would be 
given and which would be denied. 
Thereafter, when convened in open court, the trial 
judge went through a thorough and probing interrogation of all 
of the jurors as to numerous questions bearing on the qualifi-
cations of the jurors to sit as unbiased and impartial (April 
8 Tr., pp. 13-46). 
The Court then inquired of counsel if they had addi-
tional questions to be presented to the jury (April 8 Tr., 
43:7-8). Upon such request by counsel, the Court again quer-
ied the jury as to additional matters and again asked counsel 
if there was anything else to be offered (April 8 Tr., 
43:23). After all questions had been asked, except those 
specifically declined in the conference in chambers (supra), 
counsel for plaintiff passed the jury for cause (April 8 Tr., 
46:10-11). 
Thereafter in chambers, plaintiff's counsel made a 
motion for a mistrial on the failure of the Court to give the 
voir dire questions previously ruled upon by the Court (April 
8 Tr., 51:23-25, 52:1-17). 
The requested voir dire questions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. 6. 9 
and 11 were properly denied by the Court as not being proba-
tive of matters that would shed light on the bias, prejudice, 
or impartiality of the jurors, or were covered substantially 
in the interrogation of the jurors conducted by the trial 
judge (April 8 Tr., pp. 13-46). 
As to Question 3 regarding age, obviously plaintiff's 
counsel could view the jurors and could approximate their ages 
without a specific disclosure, nor would such specific dis-
closure lend any clarification of the suitability of such 
juror to sit on the jury. 
Question 11 is not a questin pertaining to bias or 
prejudice or impartiality, but is an attempt by plaintiff's 
counsel to bracket in the minds of the jury a high value to 
the case, and was properly refused. 
Questions 23, 24, 39 and 40 were calculated to cir-
cumvent the prohibition of Rule 411 of the Rules of Evidence, 
which prohibits the introduction of evidence as to insurance. 
The impropriety of such voir dire questions is supported by 
numerous decisions of the Utah Supreme Court. In Robinson v. 
Hreinson, 17 Utah 2d 261, 409 P.2d 121 (1961), the Court said: 
We do not depart from our former position: 
that the question of insurance is immaterial 
and should not be injected into the trial; 
and that it is the duty of both counsel and 
the court to guard against it. 
In Ellis v. Gilbert, 19 Utah 2d 189. 429 P.2d 39 
(1967), the Court said: 
We here observe that neither in the order of 
the trial court nor in this decision, is it 
postulated that information concerning insur-
ance should be disclosed to the jury. (Foot-
note at 3) 
Footnote 3: That introduction of the question 
of insurance into the trial is held to be 
prejudicial error. [citations omitted] 
In Young v. Barney, 20 Utah 2d 108, 433 P.2d 846 
(1967), the Court said: 
The safeguarding against disclosure to a jury 
of insurance coverage in personal injury 
trials is a very touchy subject which lawyers 
and judges have always been obliged to handle 
with such caution as to justify use of the 
metaphor "walking on eggs". The understanding 
has always been that it was prejudicial error 
to deliberately inject insurance into such a 
trial. 
Whether that injection comes in the trial during the 
course of admission of evidence in violation of Rule 411 of 
the Rules of Evidence, or through voir dire examination of the 
jury, the prejudicial effect of injecting the insurance factor 
into the trial is just as damaging. 
That the prohibitions against such disclosure applies 
to voir dire examination of the jury is illustrated in Tjas v. 
Proctor, 591 P.2d 438 (Utah, 1979), where the Court said: 
Additionally, as part of the claim for failure 
to provide a fair trial, appellants contend 
that the trial court during voir dire failed 
to ask the jurors guestions which he request-
ed. These guestions particularly as they 
raised the issue of insurance, are and were 
properly refused as this Court has previously 
indicated: 
That the question of insurance is immaterial 
and should not be injected into the trial; 
and it is the duty of both counsel and the 
court to guard against it. 
Id at page 440. 
Questions 25 and 26 as to contingent fees have no 
probative value as to impartiality of the jury. 
Questions 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 36. 37. 38 and 
41 have to do with the so-called "insurance crisis" and are 
more specifically dealt with under Point II of this brief. 
In State v. Balle. 685 P.2d 1055 (Utah. 1984). the 
only Utah case cited by appellant, allegedly supportive of his 
claim of error, in fact is damaging to plaintiff's appeal in 
this case. It reiterates the basis for which a trial judge 
should conduct voir dire examination of prospective jurors. 
At page 1060. the Court said: 
The gathering of sufficient relevant informa-
tion must, of course, be pursued with a sensi-
tivity to the privacy of the potential juror. 
Judge Harding in this case did exactly that, when he 
The Court: I am afraid you have met a judge 
who believes in the privacy of the jury and I 
believe they have a right of privacy. I be-
lieve you have a fair right of inquiry. 
(April 8 Tr.. 8:6-9) 
The Court in State v. Balle went on to say at page 60: 
The trial judge, in his broad discretionary 
power to conduct voir dire [citations omit-
ted], has a duty to protect juror privacy. 
Tias v. Proctor, supra, and State v. Balle. supra, 
both confirm that the inquiry conducted by Judge Harding over 
33 pages of transcript into the qualifications of prospective 
jurors was conscientiously and properly conducted in compli-
ance with the case law and the discretion afforded the trial 
judge in such matters. There was no error in the refusal to 
ask the questions complained of by appellant. 
POINT II 
THE COURT'S DENIAL OF VOIR DIRE QUESTIONING OF 
THE PROSPECTIVE JURORS CONCERNING "TORT REFORM 
PROPAGANDA" WAS IN CONFORMITY WITH THE DECI-
SIONS OF THE UTAH COURTS, AND DID NOT DENY 
"JANE DOE" A FAIR TRIAL. 
Plaintiff cites as authority for appellant's conten-
tion that the Court should have allowed the voir dire of the 
jurors as to whether or not they were a shareholder in an 
insurance company the case of Kilpack v. Wiqnall, 604 P.2d 
462, 643 (Utah, 1979). 
In that case, the Utah Supreme Court made reference 
to the fact that the first trial of the matter had ended in a 
mistrial when counsel for defendants objected to the voir dire 
by plaintiff1s counsel as to whether the jurors had connec-
tions with the Casualty Insurance Company. 
After the second trial and on appeal, the Court re-
versed the case on the basis that reasonable minds could not 
differ, and that the actions of the defendants in the case 
constituted negligence and the seven-year-old child was not 
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. 
The issue of voir dire examination of the jury as to 
connections with the casualty insurance was never ruled upon 
by the Court in the case, and only incidentally mentioned in a 
footnote citing Balle v. Smith, 81 Utah 179, 17 P.2d 224 
(1932) for the proposition that a plaintiff would be entitled 
to know a juror's interest in an insurance or casualty com-
pany. In the Balle case, the Supreme Court said at page 230: 
The company was a local one, and it was en-
tirely possible that some of the jurors might 
have been interested or connected either as a 
stockholder or an agent or debtor or creditor 
of this company. The plaintiff was entitled 
to learn whether such relationship existed. 
Such voir dire examination of the jurors was dicta in 
the case, for at page 229 the Court said: 
Counsel for plaintiffs insisted he had a right 
to pursue that line of questioning, and stated 
he would confine himself strictly to determ-
ining if any juror was interested as a stock-
holder or officer, employee, debtor or credi-
tor of Intermountain Lloyds... 
The Court went on to say, however, that 
The plaintiff, however, is not the appel-
lant,...so that that particular ruling of the 
Court in refusing counsel permission to ask 
the question is not directly involved on this 
appeal. 
In the Balle case, because it was a local company and 
there was a considerable possibility that prospective jurors 
might be stockholders, agents, employees, debtors or creditors 
of that insurance company, it may have been permissible to 
have asked the question about such connection. However, in 
the case at bar there is no evidence that such local company 
status prevailed, and there was no basis for requesting that 
question. 
When Kilpack and Balle are examined in the light of 
Tjas v. Proctor, supra, which specifically reaffirmed its 
ruling in Robinson v. Hreinson, supra, that such voir dire 
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questioning of the jurors is immaterial and not permitted, 
clarification is provided to the the citation in State v. 
Balle, supra, to the fact that 
The trial judge, in his broad discretionary 
power to conduct voir dire,...[citations omit-
ted] has a duty to protect juror privacy. 
The trial judge in the case at bar examined the voir 
dire requests of plaintiff and correctly denied such requests. 
The questions requested by plaintiff's counsel Nos. 
28 - 34, and 36 - 41 are clearly objectionable. They are 
clearly intended to place before the jury the spector of an 
insurance crisis. 
To determine if they have been "tainted" by the arti-
cles attached to plaintiff's brief on appeal as Exhibit A; 
the trial court would have had to inquire of the jurors as to 
their reading of said articles. 
If you ask the jurors to examine or to consider the 
materials set forth in the alleged advertising or "propa-
ganda", once they have been asked to read or examine the 
allegedly offensive articles, that juror has then been tainted 
by having read such articles and would be subject to challenge 
for cause. 
Appellant cites no Utah authorities approving of such 
voir dire interrogation of prospective jurors. Borkoski v. 
Yost, 594 P.2d 688 (Mont., 1979) cited by plaintiff cites the 
jurisdictions of California, Kentucky, Missouri, North Caro-
lina, Texas and the Court of Appeals of the Third Circuit as 
holding such inquiries to be reversible error. The case then 
cites Arkansas, New York, Kansas and Connecticut for presum-
ably holding contrary. 
In Johnson v. Hansen, 389 P.2d 330 (Or., 1964), the 
Court declined to reverse for failure to provide such voir 
dire examinations and said: 
In the ordinary case, the presence or absence 
of insurance is not only irrelevant but the 
unnecessary injection of the subject into the 
trial is prejudicial. 
The Court in that case held that the requested voir 
dire inquiry was improper. 
The Barton v. Owen, 139 Cal.Rptr. 494, 71 Cal. App. 
3rd 484 (1977) cited by plaintiff in support of such questions 
as to the malpractice insurance crisis being improper, wherein 
the Court said: 
We find, however, that the trial judge prop-
erly used his discretion to limit the voir 
dire in this case. The proposed voir dire 
question would have injected into the present 
case unnecessary emphasis on the subject of 
malpractice insurance...for it is likely that 
the panel would have surmised that the plain-
tiff was discussing the overall medical insur-
ance crisis only because the defendant was 
similarly insured, (emphasis added) 
The footnote to that case shows that the requested 
voir dire examination question substantially encompasses the 
requests submitted by plaintiff, which was properly denied by 
the trial judge in the case at bar. 
Of note, the Borkoski court said at page 695: 
Therefore, we further hold that, as a prelude 
to any questions concerning whether a poten-
tial juror has read or heard anything to indi-
cate that jury verdicts for plaintiffs in 
personal injury cases result in higher insur-
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ance premiums for everyone, an attorney must 
ask certain general introductory questions. 
These initial questions may be approached from 
two directions: (1) Whether the prospective 
juror has heard of or read anything (not nec-
essarily related to insurance) which might 
affect his ability to sit as an impartial 
juror (as was done by the trial judge in this 
case) or ... (emphasis added) 
If, however, no positive response was received 
to these introductory inquiries, there is no 
reason to pursue further the line of inquiry 
we have approved above. 
The foregoing are all subject to a showing 
that counsel is acting in good faith and is 
not merely attempting to impress on the jury 
the fact that defendant may be covered by 
insurance. 
In the particular case at bar, the trial judge. Judge 
Harding, in his questioning of the prospective jurors said, at 
April 8 Tr., page 42:24 
Is there anything in any of your backgrounds, 
any experience or anything you have heard or 
read or seen that would cause you to be affec-
ted, or would affect you in the amount of 
compensation that you might award in a case? 
Anything in your background that you feel 
would affect you in a determination of the 
amount of compensation you might award in a 
case? OK, the record may reflect that there 
is no indication. 
Thus, in a preliminary question submitted to the 
jury, almost exactly parrotting the recommended procedure of 
the Montana court in Borkoski. the trial court received no 
affirmative responses, and as stated by the Borkoski court, no 
positive response having been received to these introductory 
inquiries, there was no reason to pursue further that line of 
inquiry. 
As pointed out in State v. Balle, supra, the trial 
court has a broad discretion with regard to voir dire examina-
tion of the jury. Examination of plaintiff's proposed voir 
dire questions as to the issue of the alleged "lawsuit or 
liability crisis" and the effect of advertising on the insur-
ance rates has been consistently rejected by the Utah courts. 
Certainly a more searching inquiry into the reading habits and 
articles alleged to be offensive and affecting the bias of the 
jury would have clearly created a prejudicial bias against the 
defendant in the case, and would have led the jury to surmise, 
as stated in Barton v. Owen, supra, that the plaintiff was 
discussing the insurance crisis only because the defendant was 
insured. 
The denial of the voir dire requests were not only 
within the discretion afforded the trial court, but were re-
quired to prevent prejudice from being injected into the trial. 
POINT III 
THE RECORD IS DEVOID OF EVIDENCE THAT DEFEN-
DANT TRIED TO MISLEAD THE JURY INTO THINKING 
THAT A "SICK OLD WIDOW" WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE 
TO PAY THE JUDGMENT. 
In his Point III, the appellant first creates a straw 
man and then attempts to blow him down. Appellant contends 
that there was insurance coverage of $100,000. While that is 
not a part of the record of the proceeding and is not relevant 
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to this inquiry, such is the fact. Appellant contends that 
the insurance carrier had $100,000 at risk but the estate had 
no financial risk at all. 
The record shows that in his closing argument, plain-
tiff's counsel asked the jury to enter in the special damage 
question $124,927 (April 10 Tr.. pp. 125. 132). 
In addition to these special damages, counsel asked 
the jury to make a further award for general damages, suggest-
ing, improperly, a per diem argument for the depression of 
$1.00. $10.00. or $25.00 per day for the previous five years 
and for the future. 
Whether the estate was substantial or not is immater-
ial. The estate was at risk. 
Prior to the commencement of the trial, plaintiff's 
counsel filed a motion to exclude Florence Reeves from sitting 
at counsel table. The Court considered that motion and denied 
it (April 8 Tr.. page 2): 
As far as her coming and sitting at counsel 
table. I will permit her to be present during 
the voir dire of the jury for purposes of 
permitting her to assist counsel in the selec-
tion of the jury, in view of the fact that she 
is the only heir of the estate of Melvin 
Reeves and is therefore in the best position 
to assist counsel in making that deterrainaton. 
(emphasis added) 
Prior to first examination of prospective jurors. 
plaintiff's counsel then requested an admonition to the jury 
to explain the presence of Florence Reeves during the voir 
dire examination (April 8 Tr.. page 6): 
I think if the Court feels obligated to intro-
duce her to the jury, that the court should 
advise the jury at that point, so there is no 
misunderstanding, that she is not a party to 
this case and that there is no showing --
there is no reason for the jury to suppose or 
guess or speculate that she is going to have 
to pay any money. 
The Court agreed to that request, and gave the clari-
fication to the jury (April 8 Tr.. page 46): 
Ladies and gentlemen, one last matter here 
initially. Seated, as indicated, immediately 
to the left of Mr. Jeffs is Florence Reeves. 
She is not a party to this action. She is. 
however, the widow of Melvin Reeves, and this 
suit involves Mr. Melvin Reeves, who died not 
related to this accident, but he died after 
the accident, and she is present here, (empha-
sis added) 
Immediately after the voir dire questioning by the 
Court, and after she had been identified to the jurors and 
they had been identified to her. in compliance with the 
Court's initial ruling that she could assist with the selec-
tion of the jury, she was excused and left the courtroom. 
(April 8 Tr.. 47:2-4) 
Although she had been deposed some two years earlier 
as a courtesy to counsel and without notice, she was intended 
to be a witness at the trial as the only witness available to 
the defense who saw the accident. Her health prevented such 
happening. As an officer of the Court, defense counsel gave 
as his reasons for not producing Florence Reeves as a witness 
her fragile health. (April 9 Tr.. pp. 204-205. attached here-
to as Exhibit A). 
This writer has found no Utah decisions discussing 
the matter. Appellant has cited but one case, and that from 
the Supreme Court of Michigan from 1965. In that case, the 
issue was not the allowance of the widow at counsel table for 
assistance in selecting the jury in a locality unfamiliar to 
counsel, as in the case now at bar, but was maintained at the 
counsel table, was introduced by defense counsel as the widow 
of the deceased, and the matter of her presence there or the 
fact of her not being a party to the suit was never explained 
to the jury. Despite several objections during the course of 
the trial, she remained at counsel table throughout the 
trial. That case is not applicable to the case now at bar. 
Parenthetically, it should be noted that in the 
introducton of the parties, the plaintiff was not present in 
court, but her husband, who was no longer a party in the pro-
ceeding, was introduced by plaintiff's counsel. "Jane Doe's" 
husband sat at counsel table not only during voir dire exami-
nation, but during various stages of the trial. (April 8 Tr., 
page 13). 
In appellant's argument on this point, appellant 
makes assertions that there was an attempt by defense counsel 
to mislead the jury into thinking that the widow was respons-
ible to pay the judgment. That is not supported by the 
record, but only by assertions made out of the presence of the 
jury by plaintiff's counsel (April 8 Tr., page 6) and was 
fully explained by the Court to the jury before the completion 
of voir dire examination. 
In plaintiff's argument asking the Court to exclude 
Florence Reeves from the courtroom and from the counsel table, 
plaintifffs counsel makes accusations that her presence was an 
attempt to influence the jury into believing that she was to 
pay any judgment. No where in the briefs nor in the oral 
argument of defense counsel, nor in any presentation, was 
there any reference whatsoever to Florence Reeves except for 
the utilization of her help in the selection of jurors during 
voir dire, as specifically permitted by the Court. She was 
then taken from the courtroom and never returned to the pres-
ence of the jury. 
Plaintiff's argument that "Why should defense counsel 
be able to convey the same message by a charade or play-
acting?" is creating a paranoid characterization that defense 
counsel might have argued that judgment would come from this 
widow's pocket, when in fact no such argument or discussion 
was ever held or suggested to the jury. That is, the effort 
by appellant is to set up a straw man of a potential, sup-
posed, implication from Mrs. Reeves' presence at the counsel 
table during voir dire, and is an inference that was not pres-
ent in the courtroom, nor was it made in any respect during 
the presentation of the case. 
The Court's attention is also drawn to Instruction 
No. 2 given by the trial court (copy attached as Exhibit B) 
wherein the trial court specifically pointed out that Shirlene 
Hafen was made the defendant in the action because she was the 
representative of the estate of Melvin Reeves, and if plain-
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tiff should be awarded judgment it would be awarded against 
the estate of Melvin Reeves (Record, Vol. 6, page 95). 
The Special Verdict submitted to the jury does not 
even propose that the judgment would be against the estate. 
The Special Verdict sought only the finding of the questions 
of whether Melvin Reeves had been negligent, and whether that 
was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries, and the 
amount of those injuries. Such presentation could not be 
construed by the jury to mislead them as asserted in plain-
tiffs Point III. 
POINT IV 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO THE TRIAL COURT WAS 
ADMISSIBLE AND WITHIN THE DISCRETION OF THE 
TRIAL COURT TO BE RECEIVED IN EVIDENCE, AND 
DID NOT CONSTITUTE CHARACTER ASSASSINATION. 
Plaintiff claimed that she had symptoms of depression 
and other symptoms, demonstrating a neuropsychological injury 
to the brain, attributable to the accident. 
The plaintiff had the burden of proving by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the claimed neuropsychological 
injuries were caused by the accident which was the subject 
matter of the lawsuit. The defense is entitled to present 
evidence to refute such claims, or evidence which would have 
the tendancy to cast doubt on whether the plaintiff had sus-
tained her burden of proof of showing causal relation of the 
claimed neuropsychological injury to the accident. 
The issue of whether the plaintiff smokes or does not 
smoke was never presented in testimony to the jury. The only 
involvement of the question was that on page 10 of a 12-page 
document of the medical records of the plaintiff (Exhibit 7). 
a preoperative information sheet filled out by the plaintiff 
herself, by a series of circled answers to 25 questions, the 
plaintiff circled "yes" to the question "Do you smoke?" No 
mention was made in oral testimony to such fact, nor was any 
oral argument ever presented or raised with the jury as to 
such fact. 
With regard to the drinking of alcohol, in the same 
medical records on the same information sheet, the plaintiff 
answered the question "Do you drink alcohol?" with a circled 
"yes." On other medical records, on page 12 of a 22-page 
document introduced as Exhibit 6. the similar preoperative 
information filled out by the plaintiff to the question "Do 
you drink alcohol?" was again answered "yes." 
No mention was made in oral testimony or in argument 
or presentation to the jury with regard to the drinking of 
alcohol. The trial court required excising of the handwritten 
word "alcohol" in the margin of the record, but allowed the 
questions and answers on smoking and the use of alcohol to 
remain on the preoperative information sheets as a part of the 
medical records. (April 10 Tr.. pp 15-16). 
The Court further allowed plaintiff1s counsel to 
substitute for the hospital records a photocopy with the hand-
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written notation of "alcohol" blanked out so that it could not 
be read by the jury. 
After hearing in camera both from plaintiff's expert 
Dr. Gummow, and from the plaintiff herself as to her use of 
marijuana, the Court prohibited submission to the jury of her 
prior use of marijuana, holding that the prejudicial effect 
outweighed the probative value despite the prior marijuana use 
and its potential effect on the plaintiff's depression. 
No questioning was undertaken in the presence of the 
jury as to the plaintiff's prior use of marijuana, or as to 
the expert's opinion of the effect of marijuana on plaintiff's 
depression. As such, the issue was never presented to the 
jury (April 10 Tr., page 13). Such issues were never submit-
ted to the jury in oral argument or in presentation of evi-
dence. 
With regard to premarital sex, the hospital record 
exhibits show that on March 3, 1980 plaintiff had a spontan-
eous abortion, which occurred at two months of gestation. 
Although the testimony of the plaintiff showed that she had 
been married just one month prior to the spontaneous abortion, 
the trial court correctly permitted the introduction of the 
medical records showing the spontaneous abortion, but prohib-
ited counsel from questioning the plaintiff regarding premari-
tal sex (April 10 Tr., 53:19-23). No reference was made in 
any of the questioning of the witnesses, nor in oral argu-
ments, nor was anything presented to the jury pertaining to 
premarital sex. 
With regard to the spontaneous abortion, reference to 
which appeared in the records of the Dixie Medical Center 
(Exhibit 6), plaintiff's counsel urged the Court to prohibit 
the use of the words "spontaneous abortion", but to refer to 
it as a "miscarriage." The Court required defense counsel to 
so refer to the abortion as a miscarriage (April 9 Tr.« 
137:3-12). All refereces in the interrogation of witnesses 
and in the argument of counsel referred to the spontaneous 
abortion as a miscarriage, at the request of plaintiff's coun-
sel. 
Plaintiff's expert. Dr. Gummow, on crossexamination 
admitted that she had not been informed of the miscarriage or 
sterilization until the night before her trial testimony. The 
doctor further admitted that with some women, a miscarriage 
can produce depression, and further admitted that a voluntary 
sterilization can produce depression in some women. Dr. Gum-
mow further testified that at no time during her testing in 
1986, nor in the testing by her colleague Dr. Nielsen, did the 
plaintiff ever disclose to them the miscarriage or the volun-
tary sterilization, which occurred post-accident. 
Dr. David Weight, defendant's expert, testified that 
the depressions which plaintiff was suffering could be caused 
by anything which would cause a person to grieve. He further 
testified that some of the factors that the plaintiff had 
provided to him to indicate a possible source of the depres-
sion she was suffering were the lack of stability of her marr-
iage (April 9 Tr., page 265), continued litigation problems. 
concern that she was not working at her previous level, that 
she was not happy in her present circumstances. 
At no time during Dr. Weight's examination did the 
plaintiff ever disclose the miscarriage or the voluntary ster-
ilization that occurred after the accident (April 9 Tr., page 
266). 
Dr. Weight further testified that the decision on a 
voluntary sterilization is very important in a person's life, 
and that sometimes people make the decision and then have 
second thoughts or regrets thereafter. Dr. Weight further 
testified that if he had been aware of the miscarriage or the 
sterilization, he would have gone into those matters very 
deeply to determine whether or not those two factors were the 
cause of her depression (April 9 Tr., page 267). 
The issue of the miscarriage prior to the accident, 
and the voluntary sterilization thus become material issues to 
the causes related by the plaintiff in her depression, which 
was the fundamental symptom evaluated by plaintiff's expert. 
Dr. Gummow, in determining that plaintiff had suffered a brain 
deficit. 
The Court thus concluded that the issue of the mis-
carriage and the issue of the voluntary sterilization became 
relevant and material to the issues of the plaintiff's claims 
of depression being the fundamental symptom of the alleged 
brain injury, and whether it was causally connected to the 
accident or eminated from causes extraneous to the accident. 
Upon crossexamination, plaintiff was asked about 
whether she had had a miscarriage in March, 1980. She ad-
mitted that she had (April 10 tr. , page 60). When asked 
whether it was upsetting to her, she admitted that it was very 
upsetting. 
When asked whether she was frustrated for not being 
able to carry the baby full term, her answer was: "I wasn't 
frustrated; I was devastated." (April 10 Tr.. 60:11-25, 
61:1-3). She still admitted feelings from that miscarriage. 
She further admitted on crossexamination that in 
July. 1983, she had had a sterilization (April 10 Tr., 
62:13-21, 63:7-12). She admitted that she did not remember 
telling Dr. Neilsen or Dr. Gummow about the sterilization or 
the miscarriage (April 10 Tr., page 64). Part of Exhibit 7 
was a sterilization permit dated August 25, 1983, signed by 
the plaintiff, by which she granted permission for the steril-
ization. The permission reads: 
It has been explained to me that I will prob-
ably be sterile as a result of this operation, 
but no such result has been warranted. I 
understand that the word ,lsterilitv,, means 
that I 
or bear 
ful. I 
may be unabl 
children if 
also unders 
e to 
said 
tand 
inseminate 
oper 
that 
:ation 
this 
or 
is 
conceive 
success-
procedure is 
generally irreversible. I voluntarily request 
the operation. (emphasis added) [page 4, 
Exhibit 7] 
Plaintiff's alleged character assassination is not 
that at all. No reference was made in testimony or oral argu-
ment that the plaintiff smoked, drank alcohol, engaged in 
premarital sex, or used marijuana. The only reference to 
smoking and alcohol was contained in the plaintiff's own in-
formation sheet filed with the Dixie Medical Center at the 
time of admission to the hospital, as referenced above. The 
medical records and testimony pertaining to the miscarriage 
and voluntary sterilization directly relate to the primary 
symptoms, and are the medical records of the plaintiff. 
When plaintiff appears before the Court and claims 
that she suffers from depression, and through the use of her 
experts alleges that this occurs as a result of the accident, 
defendant is entitled to submit to the court medical records 
and other evidence to demonstrate that there are primary and 
direct causes of depression unrelated to the accident which 
may be an explanation for the claimed symptoms. In addition, 
the inferences drawn from such information could well and did 
presumably lead the jury to conclude that she did not suffer a 
neuropsychological injury in the accident, but that this re-
lated, or could relate, to the instability of her marriage, 
the prior miscarriage, and the voluntary sterilization. 
The claim that the limited information submitted to 
the jury produced prejudicial effects in view of the "ultra-
conservative Mormon community" of St. George is purely con-
jectural on the part of counsel. This writer1 s experience in 
St. George would lead him to conclude that it is a retirement 
community that attracts people from all over the United States 
because of its weather. There is no evidence before the 
Court, in fact or in truth, that St. George is an "ultracon-
servative Mormon community." 
There is no indication to think that the jury which 
was empaneled was prejudiced by the information on the hospi-
tal records that plaintiff smokes or drinks. Such presumed 
prejudice is merely conjectural at best. The trial court 
amply demonstrated that the facts about the plaintiff are 
admissible in evidence because they are relevant and material 
the inquiries to be submitted to the jury. Plaintiff's own 
testimony that she was "devastated" by the miscarriage, and 
the impact of the voluntary sterilization are subject matters 
required to be submitted to the jury, in view of the plain-
tiff's claims of depression. 
Plaintiff's argument suggests that the jury could 
have drawn its own conclusions, and that is the very function 
of the jury. The accusation of character assassination is not 
borne out by the record. The record reflects that the trial 
court limited the introduction of evidence to the medical 
records as they existed, and the interrogations pertaining to 
the effect of the miscarriage and the voluntary steriliza-
tion. The presentation of such evidence was a matter-of-fact 
presentation to explain the depression. It can in no way be 
characterized as character assassination. 
In this case, plaintiff brought suit claiming a 
neuropsychological injury, and asked for an award of hundreds 
of thousands of dollars. The medical records of the plaintiff 
herself, and her own testimony, amply demonstrate that the two 
events are unrelated to the accident. It would have been 
reversible error for the trial judge to have denied such rele-
vant and probative evidence from being admitted to explain the 
depression to which she was laying claim. 
POINT V 
"JANE DOE" WAS NOT DENIED A FAIR TRIAL BY ANY 
SURPRISE TESTIMONY. 
In appellants Point V. appellant asserts that the 
defense submitted surprise testiomony of a miscarriage prior 
to the accident, and a voluntary sterilization approximately 
one year after the accident and a year before her first 
examination by plaintiff's psychologist. Appellant 
characterizes this as "surprise" testimony. 
As stated by appellant, "Jane Doe's" expert testified 
that the most severe symptom of the alleged brain damage was 
depression. Plaintiff, by alleging the neuropsychological 
injury, has placed her medical records, pre-accident and 
post-accident conditions as relevant to the inquiry. 
The complaint in this case was filed July 1, 1983 
(Record. Vol. 1, pp. 1-3). At least by that point, and 
probably prior thereto, plaintiff's counsel had access through 
the plaintiff to all of the medical records of the plaintiff. 
On April 22, 1986, just under one year prior to the 
trial of this matter, defendant took the records deposition of 
the Dixie Medical Center (Record, Vol. 3, pp. 145-146; Vol. 
6, pp. 219-220). 
Coincident with that, defendant issued a subpoena 
duces tecum for the records of the Dixie Medical Center 
(Record, Vol 6, page 221). 
A letter was sent to Dixie Medical Center reguesting 
such medical records, with a copy to plaintiff's counsel 
(Record, Vol. 6, page 222). A copy of the subpoena and the 
Notice of Records Deposition were also submitted to 
plaintiff f s counsel. 
Thus, at least one year prior to trial, plaintiff's 
counsel had notice that defendant was obtaining and examining 
all medical records on the plaintiff. If the information 
pertaining to the miscarriage and the voluntary sterilization 
came as a surprise to plaintiff's counsel, it is only a 
surprise because of his failure to examine medical records to 
which he had access long before defense counsel did. 
In addition to that, the so-called "surprise" 
testimony pertaining to the miscarriage and voluntary 
sterilization was information within the knowledge and 
understanding of the plaintiff herself. If she failed to 
inform her counsel of facts germane to the issues in this 
case, it does not lie in counsel to try to shift 
responsibility away from plaintiff and attempt to place it on 
defense counsel. There was no surprise that could not readily 
have been examined, and for which plaintiff's counsel had 
access long before defense counsel. 
The objections of plaintiff's counsel that the 
medical records were a surprise to counsel are not valid 
objections to the admissibility, since such information was 
readily available to plaintiff's counsel. It was probably 
already within the confines of their medical file at the time 
it was subpoenaed by defense. 
The issue in this case from the very inception has 
been whether the neuropsychological injury was caused by the 
accident. That was an issue framed in the amended complaint 
and in the pretrial order. The evidence of the miscarriage 
prior to the accident, and the evidence of the voluntary 
sterilization subsequent to the accident bear upon that 
issue. The issue of causation was always before the Court, 
and is not a new theory, as purported by appellant. 
Anderson v. Bradley, 590 P.2d 339 (1979) frames the 
issue and the applicable law. The allegation therein was that 
the officer's testimony that the plaintiff told him at the 
hospital that he saw the car but could not get out of its 
way. The Court held that that statement was not necessarily 
inconsistent with the officer's testimony that the plaintiff 
had sprinted across the road. The Court held that that was a 
jury prerogative to weigh that evidence. The Court held that 
that was not surprise, and said: 
In any event, surprise as a grounds for a new 
trial is only that which ordinary prudence 
could not have guarded against. The surprise 
claimed here may not be so catagorized, since 
it could have been easily guarded against by 
utilization of available discovery 
procedures. (emphasis added) 
In the instant case, not only did plaintiff's counsel 
have the available discovery procedures, but had the 
cooperation of the plaintiff in providing consent to obtain 
any medical records that plaintiff's counsel desired to 
obtain. Plaintiff's counsel had notice virtually one year 
prior to trial that defendant's counsel had subpoenaed and 
obtained the medical records of the Dixie Medical Center. As 
such, the claim of surprise is not appropriate. 
In the case at bar. there was no attempt to conceal 
the acguisition of the records one year prior to trial, nor to 
prevent access by plaintiff's counsel, which could not have 
been accomplished in any event. 
Plaintiff cites Eagle v. American Tel. & Tel. Co.. 
769 F.2d 541 (9th Cir. 1985) for the proposition of surprise. 
In that case, at a summary judgment hearing an attempt was 
made by the plaintiff to advance a new theory of damages. In 
the instant case, the dispute as to causation of the alleged 
neuropsychological injury was always present from the time of 
the filing of the answer denying the brain injury having been 
caused by the accident. Such case is inapplicable to the 
issue here. 
The further case cited by the plaintiff of Conway v. 
Chemical Leaman Tanklines. Inc.. 687 F.2d 108 (5th Cir. 1982) 
points out that "The surprise, however, must be inconsistent 
with substantial justice" in order to justify a grant of new 
trial. 
That ruling is consistent with our Rule 59(a)(3) 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: "Action or surprise, which 
ordinary prudence could not have guarded against." 
The claim of surprise in this matter is an attempt by 
appellant to shift from the plaintiff the responsibility to 
inform her counsel of all material matters relative to the 
presentation of her case, and from plaintiff's counsel the 
responsibility to undertake ordinary discovery process or to 
be alerted by the discovery initiated by the defense and to 
examine the medical records obtained thereby, which had always 
been available to plaintiff's counsel. 
Plaintiff cites the case of Sacawa v. Polikoff, 375 
A.2d 279 (N.J. Super. 1977), for the proposition that the 
doctor defending a medical malpractice case failed to reveal 
that he had taken x-rays of the plaintiff. As such, the facts 
are distinguishable, because here the medical records are not 
those taken by the defendant at defendant's request, but are 
the medical records of the plaintiff herself, within her own 
knowledge and availability. The citation is not applicable. 
The citation to Walker v. Distler, 296 P.2d 452, 
again a medical malpractice case, the doctor failed to answer 
that the patient had pre-eclampsia. This information was 
peculiar to the doctor who was being sued in the malpractice 
case, and would not be necessarily within the knowledge of the 
plaintiff herself. However, and as such, it is not applicable 
to the situation here, where it is the plaintiff's medical 
records available to her which were utilized to show the 
probable cause of the depression which she claimed. 
The claim of surprise is unsupported by the record, 
and not a basis for reversal by this Court. 
The claim of surprise in this matter is an attempt by 
appellant to shift from the plaintiff the responsibility to 
inform her counsel of all material matters relative to the 
presentation of her case, and from plaintiff's counsel the 
responsibility to undertake ordinary discovery process or to 
be alerted by the discovery initiated by the defense and to 
examine the medical records obtained thereby, which had always 
been available to plaintiff's counsel. 
Plaintiff cites the case of Sacawa v. Polikoff, 375 
A. 2d 279 (N.J. Super. 1977), for the proposition that the 
doctor defending a medical malpractice case failed to reveal 
that he had taken x-rays of the plaintiff. As such, the facts 
are distinguishable, because here the medical records are not 
those taken by the defendant at defendant's request, but are 
the medical records of the plaintiff herself, within her own 
knowledge and availability. The citation is not applicable. 
The citation to Walker v. Distler, 296 P.2d 452, 
again a medical malpractice case, the doctor failed to answer 
that the patient had pre-eclampsia. This information was 
peculiar to the doctor who was being sued in the malpractice 
case, and would not be necessarily within the knowledge of the 
plaintiff herself. However, and as such, it is not applicable 
to the situation here, where it is the plaintiff's medical 
records available to her which were utilized to show the prob-
able cause of the depression which she claimed. 
The claim of surprise is unsupported by the record, 
and not a basis for reversal by this Court. 
POINT VI 
"JANE DOE" WAS NOT DENIED A FAIR TRIAL BY THE 
INTRODUCTION OF THE MEDICAL RECORDS INTO EVI-
DENCE . 
Without reiterating the argument set forth in Point V 
as to the surprise matter, it is readily apparent by examina-
tion of the crossexamination of Dr. Linda Gummow, and the 
direct examination of Dr. Weight, cited in Point V, that the 
failure of the plaintiff to disclose to either psychologist 
the devastating effect of the miscarriage in her life prior to 
the accident, and the obviously more devastating effect of 
voluntary sterilization was a concealing from both experts by 
the plaintiff of significant factors impacting upon her symp-
tomatic depression. Both psychologists testified that some 
women uffering a miscarriage may suffer depression from such 
fact, and that the recognition by a woman that the voluntary 
sterilization is irreversible and that she will never bear 
children and thus not be a whole woman, constitutes the re-
quired and supportive expert testimony, casting doubt on 
whether the plaintiff has established by a preponderance of 
evidence that the neuropsychological injury was caused by the 
accident. 
The plaintiff's own testimony as to the devastating 
effect of the miscarriage and her admission of the voluntary 
sterilization, coupled with the signed document executed by 
her at the time of the sterilization acknowledging the steri-
lization to be irreversible and a permanent prevention of 
child bearing, provide ample support for the medical testimony 
and the inferences to be drawn thereby by the jury (Exhibit 7, 
attached as Exhibit C). 
The failure of the plaintiff to disclose to any of 
the examining psychologists the prior miscarriage and the 
sterilization could be construed as indicative of an attempt 
to prevent the trier of the fact from discovering the truth of 
the matter as to those devastating occurrences unrelated to 
the accident. 
Because of that failure to disclose. Dr. Weight, 
called by the defense, correctly indicated that he could not 
rule out the possibility that the depression came from the 
accident, but that if he had known of the miscarriage and 
voluntary sterilization he would certainly have explored in 
depth to find out if that was the cause of the depression, and 
not the accident. Such failure to disclose, and the testimony 
of the plaintiff, raise substantial serious doubts in the 
minds of the jury, and could cause the jury to conclude that 
the neuropsychological injury did not emanate from the acci-
dent, and that plaintiff had not met her burden of proof. 
In this case, the jury entered a verdict of $30,000 
in favor of the plaintiff. It may well be that the jury con-
cluded all issues as to neuropsychological injury and the 
shoulder injury favorable to the plaintiff, but did not be-
lieve the plaintiff's testimony as to the amounts she claimed 
for damages, and awarded what, in the jury's mind, was a rea-
sonable amount to be awarded for such injuries. Appellant 
cannot contend that they were prevented from receiving a just 
verdict by the jury, when she received a $30,000 verdict. 
As pointed out by appellant's brief, "Jane Doe's" own 
expert testified that she could form no opinion as to whether 
the sterilization or miscarriage caused the depression or 
guilt in "Jane Doe" (April 9 Tr., pp. 122-123). 
In Kimes v. Herrin, 705 P.2d 108 (Mont. 1985). cited 
by plaintiff, the issue submitted to the jury was whether the 
father's drinking and associated family fighting were relevant 
injuries claimed by the plaintiff. The case is totally dis-
similar to the facts before the Court in this case. 
Appellant contends that the lack of medical testimony 
linking "Jane Doe's" miscarriage and sterilization to the 
depression for which she suffered is asking this Court to 
countenance the concealing of vital information from the ex-
perts, and to submit an unfounded claim of neuropsychological 
injury. 
The citation of appellant to Pearce v. Wistesen. 701 
P.2d 489 (Utah, 1985) is inapplicable. There, the evidence 
sought to be introduced concerned the effect of alcohol in-
gested remotely in time and beyond the realm of physical 
effect on the body. In the case now before the Court, the 
issue is the depression occasioned a potential multitude of 
causes (instability of the marriage, miscarriage, voluntary 
sterilization, and perhaps even the auto accident). In view 
of "Jane Doe's" own testimony as to the effect of the 
miscarriage and sterilization, it can hardly be said that such 
evidence was not relevant to the inquiry as to the cause of 
the depression symptoms. 
Appellant cites McCormick, Sec. 313. 3rd ed., 1984. 
on the issue of whether an opinion offered by a hospital rec-
ord without the possibility of crossexamination is permissi-
ble. In this case, the hospital records were merely confirm-
atory of testimony of the plaintiff herself, admitting that 
she had had a miscarriage prior to the accident and a volun-
tary sterilization subsequent to the accident and before her 
first examination by a psychologist. As such, no opinions 
were asked or produced by the hospital records. They were 
factual records received as business records. Such records 
were not objected to on the basis of their being an opinion, 
as cited in appellant's brief, nor on any foundational basis, 
but only on the basis of surprise and relevance. 
The Court correctly ruled that they were relevant to 
the inquiry and that they were admissible. 
The Court1s attention is called to the Pearce case, 
supra, wherein the Court said: 
This Court has followed the general rule that 
the trial court's decision to admit or exclude 
evidence will not be reversed unless it abused 
its discretionary powers, [citations omitted] 
The Court went on to say, at page 492: 
If evidence has some probative value but has a 
tendancy to unduly prejudice or confuse the 
issues or to mislead the jury, the trial court 
must balance the probative value against those 
countervailing factors to determine whether 
the evidence should be admitted. "Precedent,M 
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concluded the Court in Carlson, is of little 
value in reviewing such cases.... We simply 
determine whether on the facts of the parti-
cular case, the trial court's ruling was 
within the reasonable or permissible range 
[citations omitted] 
It is the contention of the defendant in this case 
that the Court judiciously and carefully weighed those con-
siderations and admitted the evidence now claimed to be 
error. It was within the discretionary authority of the court 
to admit such evidence, having concluded that it was relevant 
to the inquiries and claims of the plaintiff, in view of the 
crossexaraination of plaintiffs own expert prior to the intro-
duction of such evidence. 
As stated by the Court in Hill v. Bache Halsey Stuart 
Sheilds, Inc., 790 F.2 817 (10th Cir. 1986) at page 826 rele-
vant evidence must be "substantially outweighed" by the danger 
of confusion or delay to justify exclusion. In this case, the 
trial court concluded that the evidence was material and rele-
vant and should not be excluded. 
The Court is cited also to Thompson v. LeGrand John-
son Construction Co., 688 P.2d 489 (1984), wherein the Court 
The issue of causation in this case is not a 
matter of such technical sophistication as to 
be solely within the realm of expert opinion. 
Instead, it is a fact question of whether 
plaintiff's disabilities were attributable to 
the condition or to some preexisting condi-
tion. Expert testimony can be helpful in such 
a situation, but it is not, as the plaintiff 
suggests, conclusive, [citations omitted] 
Also, the Court is cited to Dixon v. Stewart, 658 
P.2d 591 (Utah, 1982) wherein the Court said: 
In general, expert testimony is admissible 
when (1) it appears that the matter before the 
jury is not within the knowledge of the 
average layman or concerns a subject not 
within average experience, and (2) the 
testimony is such that it will be an aid to 
the jurors regarding the issue before them. 
Whether or not these two criteria are met is a 
matter to be determined by the trial court, 
which is given considerable discretion. 
Both the testimony of the plaintiff herself and the 
testimony of the experts corroborate the relevance and 
materiality of the testimony as to the miscarriage and the 
sterilization, and refute the claim of error in admitting such 
evidence. 
POINT VII 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN EXCLUDING LAY 
OPINION TESTIMONY. THE TRIAL COURT ONLY RE-
QUIRED A PROPER FOUNDATION FOR THE TESTIMONY 
OF THE LAY WITNESS. 
In regard to the testimony of Dennis Parker, the 
Courtfs attention is called to the Transcript of April 9, page 
28, where the Court said: 
I am going to allow you to have the witness 
testify as to contact he has observed, and he 
is limited to that ability. Counsel, so if you 
want to ask him those kinds of questions. 
Then counsel asked whether he knew of any difficulty 
"Jane Doe" had had in her family relationships before and 
after the accident. It was objected to on the basis of no 
foundation, inasmuch as counsel had not laid a foundation 
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showing any personal observation. The Court then ruled (April 
9 Tr.. 29:23-25): 
Well. I think we need to have some time frame 
foundation information. Counsel. 
In response thereto, counsel said the time frame was 
two or three years, and he wanted to compare before and after 
the accident. He did not set a time when the witness made any 
observations, who was present, where it occurred, or anything 
of the normal and necessary foundational basis. The addition-
al objection was made (April 9 Tr.. 30:10-15). The Court 
again reiterated that counsel needed to narrow it down as to 
who was present. Then Mr. DeBry. in a leading guestion (April 
9 Tr.. 30:24). said: 
Have you noticed any difficulty, based on your 
observation comparing the time period before 
and after the accident that ["Jane Doe"] has 
had in family relationships with father, 
mother. sisters. brothers. aunts. uncles, 
nephews, husband, any of the above? 
A: Yes. 
An objection was made to that by defense counsel, and 
overruled by the Court. The question was allowed to remain. 
Thus, appellant's contention that the witness was not allowed 
to testify is not borne out by the record (April 9 Tr.. 
32:1-8). The witness then testified: 
To answer the question, they. ["Jane Doe's"] 
younger sister is my age. so -- and so I did 
know ["Jane Doe"] and her family years previ-
ously which -- they don't associate with very 
much. I have only seen her probably twice in 
the last five or six years, actually with 
["Jane Doe"]. 
To come off with the other side of the family, 
they were very outspoken with Justin1 s side of 
the family. They would go up there every 
weekend or twice a week. 
An objection was made by defense counsel: 
Mr. Jeffs: Your Honor, he has testified while 
she was there, he has not identified whether 
he was present at all. 
Court: The objection is sustained. Let's 
have him answer more direct questions. 
It was very obvious to the Court and defense counsel 
that plaintiff's counsel was not asking when the observations 
took place, where he was. who was present, what he observed, 
but only conclusory statements as to whether she was having 
family difficulties or depression or other problems. As such, 
no adequate foundation was laid, and the sustaining by the 
Court of the objections was fundamental and proper. 
The plaintiff's counsel was never precluded from 
laying a foundation to ask the questions and to establish 
whether or not the witness had the ability to observe that 
which his conclusory statements suggested. 
The Court in this case did explain the basis that 
there had not been sufficient foundation. On several occ-
asions, the Court pointed out that plaintiff needed to estab-
lish time, place and circumstance, which were never asked by 
plaintiff's counsel. Thus, no foundation was laid. 
No issue was ever raised that opinion was to be given 
by a lay witness, as permitted by Rule 701. It never got to 
that point, because the witness did give conclusory opinions 
without the necessary laying of the foundation. An examina-
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tion of the record (April 9 Tr., pp. 29-33) amply illustrates 
that the foundational basis for the alleged observations was 
never laid, and thus the predicate to the opinions was not 
laid. Nevertheless, the conclusory statements were admitted 
in part, even without adequate foundation. 
The Court gave reasons for the sustaining of the 
objections that the testimony was without foundation, and gave 
suggestions as above set forth; nevertheless, plaintiff's 
counsel did not lay the foundation. 
The Court is cited to Utah Department of Transporta-
tion v. Jones, 694 P.2d 1031 (Utah, 1984), wherein at page 
1036, the Court said: 
Admission of any type of testimony requires 
the laying of proper foundation to qualify the 
witness to give the particular testimony 
sought to be elicited. No foundation was laid 
or sought to be laid regarding Jones1 qualifi-
cation to testify regarding the highest and 
best use of the subject property. 
That exact circumstance prevails here: plaintiff did 
not lay the foundation to show that the witness had the neces-
sary competence to render whatever opinion was intended to be 
elicited. 
The Court is also cited to Ewell & Son, Inc. v. Salt 
Lake City Corporation, 27 U.2d 198, 493 P.2d 1283, wherein the 
Court said: 
Whether the allowance of such testimony, which 
we will have characterized as borderline, is 
unfair and harmful depends on the particular 
circumstances and must necessarily be left 
largely within the discretion of the trial 
court. 
The claimed conclusory statement that the witness had 
observed the relationships of the plaintiff to her family were 
not predicated by a foundational base showing how such conclu-
sions were arrived at. As stated in Hansen v. Hansen, 110 
U.2d 222. 171 P.2d 392 (1946): 
Certain answers to questions involve surmise, 
hearsay and conclusions. The Court did not 
err in not receiving them into evidence. 
Indeed, the Court could not base any finding 
upon such answers without indulging in specu-
lation. 
Such was the case in this situation. Without laying 
a foundation, any questions precluded were properly preclud-
ed. The plaintiff was not prejudiced thereby. 
POINT VIII 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT IMPROPERLY EXCLUDE 
EVIDENCE OF FUTURE MEDICAL EXPENSES. 
Appellant opines that the Court sustained an objec-
tion to the treating doctorfs testifying as to the surgical 
fees for a future operation, because the probability of the 
future surgery was not greater than 50%. That is not the 
basis of the court's action when examined in the light of the 
testimony. The Transcript of April 8, p. 93 reads: 
Doctor, to a reasonable medical probability, 
what is ["Jane Doe's"] prognosis or prospect 
for the future with respect to her shoulder 
and her collarbone injury? 
A: Well, I expect that over the next few 
years, it will be pretty stable and continue 
pretty much like it is. There is the poten-
tial for progression of traumatic arthritis, 
which is wear and tear arthritis at that joint 
where the collarbone and shoulderblade meet. 
It doesn't necessarily have to develop, but it 
wouldn't be unusual if it did. At this most 
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extenuating and adverse expression, she might 
need another operation which would be removal 
of the outside half inch of the clavicle to 
prevent contact rubbing and irritation. That 
is only possible, and I wouldn't say that it 
was any more possible than 50%. (emphasis 
added) 
On that answer, plaintiff's counsel asked for the 
surgical fees for such an operation. In view of the doctor's 
characterization that the shoulder would be "pretty stable and 
continue much like it is," that there was a "potential for 
traumatic arthritis, but it doesn't necessarily have to devel-
op," and that "at its most extenuating and adverse expression" 
she might need another operation, the testimony was not that 
such future operation was with reasonable medical probability, 
but only a possibility at the "most extenuating and adverse 
expression." On that basis, it was not within the realm of 
permissible evidence to testify as to the cost of such surgery. 
The Court then allowed counsel to go on and develop 
the potential for future arthritis set forth in the questions 
and the doctor's answers were admitted (April 8 Tr., 
94:7-25). Thus, the claim of the appellant that they were 
prevented from submitting to the jury an opinion on future 
medicals is not valid. Their claim that they were prejudiced 
by not being allowed to present such claim is not valid. 
As pointed out in Robinson v. Hreinson. supra. 
Of course, no award for damage should be based 
on mere speculation or conjection. There must 
be a firm foundation for any award by proof 
that at least more probable than not that the 
damage will be suffered. For this reason the 
jury should not be allowed to assess future 
damages on probability, but only such damages 
as it believes from the preponderance of the 
evidence the plaintiff will, with reasonable 
certainty, incur in the future. 
The Court is also cited to Jamison v. Utah Home Fire 
Insurance Co. . 559 P.2d 958 (1977), wherein at page 961 the 
Court said: 
In this connection, it is also pertinent to 
observe that the general rule is that an award 
of damages cannot properly be made on mere 
possibility or conjecture, there must be a 
firmer foundation. That is. any such award, 
must be supported by proof upon which reason-
able minds acting fairly thereon could believe 
that it is more probable than not, that damage 
was actually suffered. 
The doctor testified that at the "most extenuating 
and adverse expression11 she might need an operation, and that 
that was only possible. That does not comport with the re-
quirement in Jamison that it must be more probable than not 
that the damage was actually suffered. 
See also Alverado v. Tuckett 2 Ut.2d 16, 268 P.2d $86 
(1954), wherein the court said: 
The burden was upon the plaintiff to prove the 
charge of speeding, such a finding could not 
be based on mere speculation or conjecture but 
only on a preponderance of the evidence. This 
means the greater weight of the evidence, or 
as sometimes stated, such degree of proof that 
the greater probability of truth lies there-
in. A choice of probabilities does not meet 
this requirement. It creates only a basis for 
conjecture on which a verdict of the jury 
cannot stand, (emphasis added) 
The objections sustained by the Court were within the 
guidelines and discretion of the Court, and were properly 
ruled upon by the Court. No error was committed by such rul-
ing. See also Robinson v.Hreinson, supra. 
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POINT IX 
THE INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN BY THE COURT ON DAMAGES 
WERE NOT IMPROPER. 
Appellant contends that Instructions No. 22 and 23 
given by the Court (Record, Vol. 6, pp. 116-117) were incor-
rect statements of the law. With regard to Instruction No. 
22. the record shows that plaintiff did not object and cannot 
therefore raise the issue for the first time on appeal. The 
objections voiced by the plaintiff are set forth in Transcript 
of April 10, pp. 112-113. 
As to Insruction No. 23, the total objection was as 
follows: 
As to Instruction No. 23, again it speaks in 
terms of reasonable medical certainty instead 
of reasonable medical probability. 
No additional objection was given as a basis for 
objecting to Instruction No. 23, merely that statement. No 
citation was given to Court upon which it could predicate any 
evaluation of the claimed objection. 
The Instruction apparently was drawn by the Court not 
from reguests submitted by either of the parties but from the 
Court's own reservoir of jury instructions. The Instruction 
appears to have been drawn from 90.3, Jury Instruction Forms 
for Utah, which has parenthetically stated: 
You may consider whether any of the above 
will, with reasonable certainty, continue in 
the future, and if you so find award such 
damages as will fairly and justly compensate 
the plaintiff therefor. 
The footnote to that Instruction in Jury Instruction 
Forms for Utah reads: 
Note: In regard to future damages, we use the 
phrase, "with reasonable certainty". However 
the phrase "will probably suffer in the 
future" has been approved by our Courts, 
[citing Picino v. Utah Apex Mining. 52 Utah 
338. 173 P.2d 900] 
While the jury instruction made use of the term "rea-
sonable medical certainty", the play on semantics between 
"reasonable medical certainty" and "reasonable medical proba-
bility" is more apparent than real. As cited in the very case 
given by appellant. Picino. supra, there the distinction was 
between what may happen and what will probably happen. The 
Court said that the determination should be on the basis of 
probability. 
That plaintiff did receive an award for medical ex-
penses is demonstrated by the fact that on a stipulation of 
medical expenses of $6,700.00. the jury awarded $10,000 in 
special damages and $20,000 in general damages. Thus, appel-
lant's claim that the instructon was misleading and required 
an undue burden upon the plaintiff to sustain their showing of 
damages is refuted. 
The court is cited to Robinson v. Hreinson. supra. 
where the court said: 
For this reason the jury should not be allowed 
to assess future damages on probability, but 
only such damages as it believes from the 
preponderance of the evidence the plaintiff 
will with reasonable certainty incur in the 
future. 
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The appellant did not provide to the trial court any 
basis upon which the trial court could make an evaluation as 
to the propriety of the instructions complained of. Accord-
ingly, this Court should reject any appeal on such basis. 
POINT X 
THE JURY WAS NOT PREVENTED FROM HEARING THE 
TREATING DOCTORS OPINION AS TO "JANE DOE'S" 
ABILITY TO WORK AS A BARBER. 
Appellant claims that the treating doctor was asked a 
hypothetical question that assumed that "Jane Doe" was trained 
as a barber and that a barber spends a majority of her time 
with her arms outstretched and raised above her waist. Appel-
lant claims that that hypothetical question was not permitted. 
In fact, the question was not hypothetical at all. 
and was answered. An examination of the April 8 Transcript. 
page 92, shows that the question that was asked was: 
Assuming that that's true and assuming that a 
barber or beautician would have their hands in 
somewhat this position (indicating)(sic) 
throughout the course of their work, could 
["Jane Doe's"] current condition make barber-
ing more difficult or impossible? 
A: Yes. 
The objection was made as follows: 
I don't think it's a hypothetical at all. I 
think it's asking him a specific question in a 
leading or suggestive manner, and I object to 
the question on that basis. 
There isn't any foundation laid for if any 
knowledge he might have that what barbering 
requires or doesn't require. 
The Court sustained the objection, which was made on 
the basis that the question was leading and suggestive. Coun-
sel did not return to the hypothetical question, but then 
specifically asked the doctor: 
Doctor, does ["Jane Doe"] appear to have any 
disability based on the history that was given 
you? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Would you briefly describe what that dis-
ability is? 
A: She told me she could not barber and hair-
dress because of discomfort in her left arm. 
And she changed her job and occupation in 
response to this and now works in a situation 
where she doesn't have to use her arm in an 
upstretched and elevated manner all day. 
Thus, the objection to the leading and suggestive 
question was made, the question was reframed to be more speci-
fic to "Jane Doe" and her disability, and the question was 
specifically answered as to her inability to function as a 
barber with her arms in an outstretched and elevated manner. 
In the case of Highland Const. Co. v. Union Pacific 
RR Co., 683 P.2d 1042 (Utah, 1984), cited by the plaintiff, at 
page 1051, the Court stated: 
The Utah Rules of Evidence in force at the 
time of this trial permitted testimony by an 
expert in the form of an opinion if those 
opinions were (a) based on facts or data per-
ceived by or personally known or made known to 
the witness at the hearing and (b) within the 
scope of the special knowledge, skill, experi-
ence or training possessed by the witness. 
Rule 56(2) Utah Rules of Evidence... The ex-
pertise of the witness, his degree of famili-
arity with the necessary facts, and the logi-
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cal nexus between his opinion and the facts 
educed roust be established, (emphasis added) 
In this case, no effort was made to establish that 
the proffered opinion was "within the scope of the special 
knowledge, skill, experience or training possessed by the 
witness." 
No effort was made to lay a foundation that he had 
any special expertise to know whether or not she could do 
barbering or not. Despite that fact, the witness did testify 
to her inability to function as a barber, and that was pre-
sented to the jury. Certainly no error was committed. 
Plaintiff also cites the Court to Budd v. Salt Lake 
City, 23 Utah 515, 65 P. 486 (Utah. 1901). The attention of 
the Court is called to that portion of the Budd case beginning 
at the bottom of page 19, which reads as follows: 
As to whether or not a witness is competent to 
testify as an expert is a question . . . within 
the sound discretion of the trial judge, and 
his determination will not be reviewed or 
disturbed, unless a palpable abuse of dis-
cretion is disclosed. 
Certainly the sustaining of the objection for the 
question being leading and suggestive was within the sound 
discretion of the trial judge, and should not be disturbed on 
appeal. 
The Court is also cited to Robinson v. Hreinson, 
supra, which reiterates that the trial judge should have the 
discretion in his rulings during the trial, and that there 
must be a clear abuse of discretion before disturbing his 
ruling. 
In view of the testimony quoted above, which was 
permitted by the Court to be presented to the jury, and the 
failure of plaintiff's counsel to rephrase the question as 
other than as a leading question, it cannot be said that there 
was any abuse of such discretion. 
POINT XI 
THERE WERE NO PREJUDICIAL ERRORS COMMITTED BY 
THE TRIAL COURT. 
Without reiterating the arguments set forth in the 
prior points, suffice it state that the plaintiff received a 
substantial verdict of $10,000 special damages and $20,000 
general damages. 
The jury disbelieved "Jane Doe's" expert economist, 
who testified that the lost future earnings were predicated 
upon average earnings of $14,000 per year projected with in-
flation. On crossexamination (April 9 Tr., 181:12-14), the 
economist assumed a full time employment but did not take into 
account that the plaintiff had not had full time employment. 
He had not checked her actual earnings, either (April 
9 Tr., 183:5-8). He had no knowledge that she was only work-
ing 30 hours per week prior to the accident, and not a 40 hour 
week (April 9 Tr., 184:19-22). He did not compare the projec-
ted earnings of $14,000 against her actual earnings, but pro-
jected those lost earnings at an 8% discount rate and came up 
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with $58,000 of projected lost future earnings (April 9 Tr.. 
189:8-14). 
He used a 6.22 inflationary factor to project future 
earnings, whereas her former employer. Tom Hershey, testified 
(April 10 Tr.. 72:16-19) that when she worked as a barber for 
him that her earnings were in the vicinity of $400 or $500 per 
month, at the most. 
His projections also ignored the plaintiff's own 
testimony on crossexamination that her haircuts at Tom's Bar-
ber Shop were charged at $7.00. and that she got 60% of that 
and paid 40% for the chair furnished. 
She also testified that she quit barbering at Guys 
and Dolls because she wasn't getting enough time in there to 
make a good income, and left there to work for The Rickshaw 
for 30-35 hours at minimum wage (April 10 Tr.. 48:18-24). 
The economist also ignored the fact that she worked 
at Tom's Barber Shop for about four months after the accident, 
and then she terminated with him because she went to work 
elsewhere, because she could work more hours and earn more 
money (April 10 Tr.. 71:3-8). and that she did not inform him 
that there was anything about the barbering job that she was 
not able to handle (April 10 Tr.. 71:9-12). 
Under the actual circumstances where she had never 
earned more than minimum wage and rarely got more than 30-35 
hours per week, the testimony of plainiff's economist was not 
believable that she had lost earnings of $14,000 per year. 
Plaintiff's novel but questionable theory that plain-
tiff had suffered a neuropsychological brain injury at the 
accident, when coupled with the fact of the preaccident mis-
carriage and the postaccident sterilization, and the instabil-
ity in her married life, was not believable testimony to the 
jury. The claim that a treatment program would cost between 
$60,000 to $90,000 as testified to by Dr. Gummow becomes high-
ly suspect in view of Dr. Gummow* s own testimony on direct 
examination, where she said: 
Now. do you have an opinion based upon reason-
able neuropsychological certainty as to 
whether or not ["Jane Doe"] will improve or 
get better with respect to the brain damage? 
A: Yes. I have an opinion. 
Q: What is your opinion? 
A: My opinion is that she has recovered as 
much as she will or can be expected to do so 
due to the amount of time that has elapsed 
between the accident. Most brain injury rec-
overy occurs in the first year and a half 
after an insult, (emphasis added) 
Based upon that information and the testimony of the 
plaintiff herself that despite doctor's recommendations testi-
fied to by Dr. Gummow that she have psychotherapy, and that 
approximately five years had elapsed since the accident, no 
treatment had been undertaken. Those circumstances and the 
testimony that she should be given a treatment program costing 
sixty to ninety thousand dollars was just speculative, and not 
believed by the jury. 
With regard to the alleged prejudice, no prejudiced 
has been demonstrated by appellant's contentions in this 
brief. The facts of the matter are that the plaintiff's claim 
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of $124,927.00 in special damages was just not believed by the 
jury, and was certainly not referable to the accident. The 
jury's award of $10,000 related to the actual past medical 
expenses of $6,747.67 is a reasonable and appropriate recovery 
herein. 
POINT XII 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT FAIL TO PROVIDE FOR 
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST. 
The judgment signed by the Court provided for judg-
ment as provided by law. The defendant stipulated that the 
past medical expenses incurred to the date of entry of the 
judgment were $6,747.67. The plaintiff claimed special 
damages for loss of future earnings and future medical treat-
ment, for which she would not be entitled to interest. 
In the judgment entered by the Court, since it is 
provided by §78-27-44 that interest be awarded at 8% per annum 
from the date of occurrence on the actual damages assessed to 
the date of the judgment, plaintiff would be entitled to in-
terest at 8% on the $6,747.67 from the date of the occurrence 
until the entry of judgment. 
The judgment submitted by plaintiff through counsel 
did not include a calculation of interest pursuant to 
§78-27-44 and therefore the judgment entered by the Court is 
the only one submitted that included within it an appropriate 
method of awarding interest in accordance with said statute. 
54(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that 
the Clerk must include in the judgment signed by him the in-
terest on the verdict and the costs when taxed, as has been 
done in this case. That is all that remains to be added to 
the judgment signed by the trial judge in order to complete 
the judgment in accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure 
CONCLUSION 
The overall analysis of the transcript and exhibits 
in this case demonstrates that the trial judge judiciously, 
carefully, and with sensitivity to the protection of the 
plaintiff's privacy, limited the evidence to those items which 
are relevant, material, and germane to the issues to be 
tried. 
Appellant makes the common mistake of viewing the 
matter most favorable to the plaintiff when the rules of ap-
pellate review require the matter to be reviewed in a light 
favorable to sustaining the verdict of the jury. 
As has often been stated by the Supreme Court of 
Utah, the transcript and trial must be looked at in an overall 
picture to determine whether or not the plaintiff had a fair 
trial. In this case, the plaintiff not only had a fair trial, 
but recovered a substantial judgment of $30,000. The Court 
should now deny the appellant's request for a reversal and new 
trial. 
Respectfully submitted this 15th day of March. 1988. 
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subject with counsel, the parties, or witnesses to this 
case. 
And we will see you back at three o'clock, 
I hope. 
(The jury was excused.) 
MR. JEFFS: Your Honor, I met with 
Mrs. Reeves last night for about 15 minutes, and I have 
concluded that I will — as bad as I would like to have 
her here, I will not call her. I just do not feel that 
she can handle the strain of it. 
It's one thing to come in and sit for a few 
minutes, 20 minutes with us; it's quite a different thing 
to come out and take the witness stand and be subjected to 
the stress of cross-examination, even as carefully as I'm 
sure Mr. DeBry would deal with that. 
It still is too dangerous and I will not 
bring her. 
THE COURT: All right. I don't think you 
have any argument from Mr. DeBry on that, and the Court 
will find that she is not available for — in accordance 
with the rules. And that permits her deposition to be 
published and used in examination here by Mr. DeBry. 
23 I What about Mrs. Hafen? Why do you want her 
24 here other than to see if she really exists and to see 
EXHIBIT Nd. 25 . what she l o o k s l i k e , Counse l? PyHTPTT W M 
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MR. DeBRY: Well, your Honor, I would like 
to see if she exists. I would like to see what she looks 
like, and I think the jury is entitled to see that. 
It's true that the scope of questions would 
be very, very narrow. I would ask her who she is; if 
she — and if she's the personal representative of the 
estate; and — 
MR. JEFFS: That's on file and of record. 
He doesn't need to ask her that. 
MR. DeBRY: Well, I need to ask her in the 
sense that — the other day, as I recall, the Court ruled 
that Mrs. Reeves could come in the courtroom but not sit 
at counsel table. That was my recollection. I may be 
wrong. 
But Mrs. Reeves did come in the counsel room, 
and because we don't have photographs — 
MR. JEFFS: Your Honor — 
MR. DeBRY: Let me make a record, a verbal 
record. 
She came in with an attendant. She was 
terribly frail. She had an oxygen tube in her nose that 
she was grasping for and she sat next to Mr. Jeffs at 
23 counsel table, which, for the record, she would have been 
t j 
24 , no more than four or five feet from the jury box. And for 
all the world that jury might be wondering or speculating vj> 
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and by the trappings could very well infer that she was 
his client and she hired him and he was protecting her 
last penny. 
And I think I'm entitled to call the true 
client, and if for nothing else, say, "Are you the party 
in interest and the client in this case?" and let the jury 
look that person in the eye. 
MR. JEFFS: If we named Walker Bank as the 
PR ad litem for this proceeding, who would he call? I 
think that the argument is specious. It — the Court did 
not say she could not sit at counsel table. She can. She 
considers me as her attorney; she has from the very 
inception. 
That's why we got in the big fight over them 
going to her home the Sunday before the original trial 
setting. And I think if he's trying to carry out some 
idea of — that there is some assets or not some assets, 
l 
it is not going to be — it is not a question he could 
ask. 
MR. DeBRY: I would not ask that. 
MR. JEFFS: So I don't know that there is any 
reason to have_ her here. 
THE COURT: I really don't either, Counsel. 
24 i If you had a legitimate purpose, I certainly would -- I 
25 would certainly have her here, but simply to establish 4A" 
INSTRUCTION NO, ^ ^ 
This is a civil case in which plaintiff, Heidi Neighbor, 
seeks a money judgment against defendant, Shirlene Hafen, as Personal 
Representative ad litem of the Estate of Melvin Reeves, on account 
of bodily injuries which plaintiff alleges were sustained by her 
in an automobile/motorcycle collision occurring in St. George, 
Washington County on August 15, 1982. 
Plaintiff alleges that the collision was caused by 
negligence of Melvin Reeves. Defendant denies Melvin Reeves 
was negligent, and claims that the collision was caused by 
plaintiff's own negligence or the negligence of Justin Neighbor. 
The foregoing is not to be taken by you as facts proved 
in the case, but it is simply a brief and condensed statement 
of the contentions of the parties as appears from their written 
pleadings in the case. 
Shirlene Hafen has been made the defendant in this 
action because she is the Representative of the Estate of 
Melvin Reeves. If plaintiff should be awarded a judgment, it 
would be against the Estate of Melvin Reeves. 
DIXIE MEDICAL CENTER 
STERILIZATION PERMIT 
Date: V / ^ / f o 
Hour: -j-p-ffr I^^C . 
I hereby authorize and direct Dr. -J&l^f,, / /' / /rf^J^l^ 
and assistants of his choice ,to perform ^he-4©llowing operation upon me at the 
Dixie Medical Center: f7s/i^^ J^.-/S<s1~yy^ 
/ 
and to do any other procedure that his judgment may dictate during the above 
operation. It has been explained to me that I will probably be sterile as a 
result of this operation, but no such result has been warranted. I understand 
that the word "sterility" means that I may be unable to inseminate or conceive 
or bear children if said operation is successful. I also understand that this 
procedure is generally irreversible. 
I voluntarily request the operation. 
s^ffyiji, //Oj^/.trn^ 
Signature Witnessed: 
BY/ 2>r~^*-^ /?^ 
I joint authorizing the performance upon my wife (husband) of the surgery con-
sented to above. It has been explained to me that as a result of the operation 
my wife (husband) may be sterile. 
Signed: r 
Signature Witnessed: 
